

**TOP SECRET**

Security Information

30 October 1952

**MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the Psychological Strategy Board**

**SUBJECT : Procedure for NSC 10/5 Matters**

In the field of unconventional and psychological operations the Central Intelligence Agency is an executive and operating agency charged with carrying out projects in support of national policies. These projects include political and paramilitary operations, the general desirability of which have been determined by the senior departments of the Executive Branch of the Government. As an operating agent for these departments, CIA requires more than policy guidance. The programs and major projects which it proposes to undertake in furthering national policy should be carefully scrutinized before final approval, and the net value of the operations themselves should be periodically assessed by some authority outside the Agency, but representative both of it and of the interested executive departments. The mounting cost of these operations makes such prior assessment and continuous audit a matter of great urgency.

Under the existing mechanism for providing policy guidance and program approval, the Agency has continued in the position of having to assume too much responsibility and authority. While in the field of cold war both vision and imagination are essential, yet these qualities must be controlled by selective judgment of a detached, objective authority.

It is inevitable that cold war operations will continue over a long period of time. They involve activities which do not lend themselves to precise evaluation and it is impossible to judge in absolute terms the successes or failures of particular programs. Unlike military operations which require the continuous and increasing application of force toward an abrupt and conclusive ending, activities of this type require a fluctuating effort with no clear termination in prospect. For this reason, it is all the more important that they should not be undertaken unless all concerned are satisfied as to their desirability.

25X1

**TOP SECRET**  
Security Information

DOCUMENT NO. \_\_\_\_\_  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ☐  
☐ DECLASSIFIED  
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: \_\_\_\_\_  
AUTH: NS 10-2  
DATE: 20 MAR 1981 REVIEWER: \_\_\_\_\_

*Official*

MORI/CDF Pages 1-3

**TOP SECRET**

Security Information

Copy 6 of 9  
Page 2

The responsibilities in their respective departments of the individuals who make up the PEB, and the demands made upon their time, are such as to preclude their giving detailed study, analysis and review to the covert operations of CIA. There is needed a method by which these persons can depend, in the exercise of their responsibilities as members of PEB, on the recommendations of qualified subordinates, reserving their personal detailed consideration for those cases and matters which, by their nature, require their direct attention.

Here I have in mind the provision of a few highly qualified officers upon whom the principals could rely completely as their technical advisers, and whom their respective departments would accept in that status. It would be essential that these selected officers have competence to speak with the greatest degree of authority compatible with the individual responsibilities of the members of the PEB on the various matters to be considered, both in their capacity as advisers and staff officers of the three principals and as representatives of the departments from which they are seconded. Time would be lost and insecurity would result from formal reference of cold war projects to the routine machinery of the major departments, since this would have the inevitable result of allowing these matters to get down into the depths of departmental staffs and to be fought over and widely discussed by a large number of relatively junior officials. Hence, the selected staff officers would have to be held responsible by the principals for the necessary amount of coordinating and checking within their departments.

The Board set up a Panel in its paper dated February 20, 1952, subject: "Procedure for Handling IG/5 Matters in PEB". It is not equipped nor staffed for prompt and decisive action. Panels of this size and nature tend to be slowed down by procedural matters, and their energy dissipated.

I believe a smaller group consisting of one representative from each of the Departments of State and Defense and CIA, and with the Director of PEB as permanent chairman, can produce the results we desire, provided these representatives have the work of this group to which they are assigned as their primary responsibility, to take priority over any other work even, if necessary, to the exclusion of other duties. I believe the Joint Chiefs of Staff should provide an adviser to this Group and the Departments and Agency should furnish aides and clerical assistance as may be necessary.

I would stress to each Member of the Board the importance of selecting a high-quality representative for this Group. Representatives on the present Panel are excellent, but unhappily will not be

**TOP SECRET**

Security Information

**TOP SECRET**

Security Information

Copy 6 of 9

Page 3

available to us much longer. Replacements must be found of similar stature, and who will have the complete confidence of their respective departments and agency. Needless to say, they require full support from the very top. The success of this project will depend upon the persons selected by us.

Specifically, I recommend the Board amend its previous decisions in this field and follow the procedure set forth below except in such cases as may be otherwise provided by the President.

(1) Each Board member should designate as a member of a reviewing group a senior representative from his department or agency who will be competent to represent such member in the review of NSC 10/5 programs and projects and to make recommendations thereon. When designated, such individual should be fully empowered to obtain quick, responsive and effective action on any such program and project from any level of his department. The work incident to his assignment to this group should have priority over any other work so that he will be sufficiently free of other duties to give all the time necessary for such review. In the case of the Department of Defense, a general or flag officer representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should also be designated as military adviser to the reviewing group.

(2) The Director of FSB should chair the reviewing group.

(3) The reviewing group should not only review NSC 10/5 programs and major projects in the first instance and recommend their approval or disapproval either in whole or in part, but should also periodically review such programs and projects and recommend whether they are to be continued or discontinued, speeded or slowed, increased or decreased.

(4) The reviewing group should propose to the FSB such amendments to the present 10/5 Procedure as will implement the above recommendations, and thereafter propose to the FSB any further procedures which will enable the group efficiently to expedite its review responsibility.

(5) Final action in each case will be taken by the FSB.

If this procedure is concurred in, I recommend that it be brought formally to the notice of the National Security Council as the method which will be followed by the Board in carrying out its responsibilities under NSC 10/5.

WALTER B. SMITH  
Director

WBSmith/jr

Distribution:

Orig - Sec'y Bruce  
#2 - Sec'y Foster  
#3 - Adm. Kirk

#4 - D/DCI

**TOP SECRET**  
#5 - DCI (Rm. 126 - Admn.)  
#6 - ER ✓  
Security Information

#7 - DD/P

#8 - Mr. W. Jackson

#9 - DD/A

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL [REDACTED] TH

Noted by [REDACTED]

30 Oct 52 - [REDACTED]

Attached is a revision of the Memorandum on Procedure for NSC 10/5 Matters. The changes are in no case substantive and consist of omitting one or two sentences which seemed unnecessary and a rewording of two paragraphs in an attempt to make them closer to the views you have expressed. These are the paragraphs starting at the bottom of page 1 and the third full paragraph on page 2.

These changes were recommended by General Magruder and [REDACTED] as well as Frank Wisner.

I have sent copies of this draft to [REDACTED] and Magruder so that their principals will have it at your lunch tomorrow. I have also sent a copy to Admiral Kirk.

(OVER)

29 October 52

(DATE)

25X1

25X1